Mongolia and the Nuclear Age by Enkhsaikhan, J
43Number 14, 2007
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
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By J.Enkhsaikhan (Mongolia)
This XXI century is a nuclear century since our security,development and progress depends to a certain extent on howwe humans are dealing with the nuclear issues. Mongolia, as
member of the world family of nations, and especially sandwiched
between two nuclear-weapon powers, is directly affected by nuclear
issues. There is no escape. We have to make a choice either to be passively
affected by the perils of nuclear age or play an active role, to the extent
possible, in shaping our own future. That depends to a great extent on
us, Mongolians.
Nuclear issues could be addressed from the following angles:
national security, security of the people’s health and environment and
energy security.
A.   Nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia1
Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon free status (NWFS), institutionalization
of which is yet to be achieved, is based on the country’s policy of ensuring
its security primarily by political and legal means. In this case the status
would mean that all nuclear-weapon States, especially its two immediate
neighbors, would not only respect the status and legally commit not use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Mongolia, but also pledge
not to involve Mongolia and its territory in their nuclear calculations
and policies. As the developing dispute in Eastern Europe clearly
demonstrates, territories of third States could be used to involve them
1 The National Security Concept of Mongolia, adopted in June 1994 by the State
Great Hural (parliament) addressing the ways and means of ensuring the security of
existence of Mongolia has underlined the need to  ensure the nuclear-weapon-free status
of Mongolia at the international level and make it an important element of strengthening
the country’s security by political means. In February 2000 the parliament adopted the
Law on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status that defines the status and regulates the
legal consequences of all the related activities.
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in “power politics” of the great powers. Thus U.S. plan to base parts of
a missile-defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland “to combat
potential new threats from nations seeking nuclear weapons, like Iran”
has prompted Russia to take a tougher line in its relations with the U.S.
and suspend its participation in a key European arms control treaty that
governs deployment of troops on the continent.2 That is why the latter
commitment is very important for Mongolia in order not to be involved
in great power rivalry, but also for ensuring nuclear stability and
predictability in the region, since any change in Mongolia’s policy could
affect the balance of power in the region.
The policy of institutionalizing its NWFS is also breaking new
ground in theory and practice of creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones
(NWFZ). The General Assembly of the United Nations in 1998
welcomed Mongolia’s initiative and policy and called upon all member
States to work with it in consolidating and strengthening its security
and NWFS, while the five nuclear-weapon States (the P-5, that happen
to be the five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council) have made in 2000 a joint statement providing negative and
positive security assurances to Mongolia. At present the policy needs to
be pursued to expand the P-5 political declaration and turn it into a
legally binding commitment.  When institutionalized, Mongolia would
be the first single-State NWFZ in international relations with duly
provided security assurances from the P-5.  So far no individual State
has been able to acquire such a status, while there are over a dozen
States that could benefit from such a precedent and ensure their security
through single-State NWFZ status as part of the regional security
arrangement.
On the other hand, single-State NWFZ status could be an interim
measure for States that are currently under nuclear umbrella to abandon
it as a NWFZ (with the security assurances provided in such a case by
nuclear-weapon States) and negotiate its status as part of a regional
NWFZ. Thus in the case of Northeast Asian NWFZ, Japan and South
Korea would need to abandon U.S. nuclear umbrella and level the playing
field for negotiating the regional NWFZ. Interim single-State NWFZ
status could come in handy for them.
For Mongolia itself, institutionalization of its special status in the
form of a multilateral agreement with legally binding security assurances
2 Thus Russia has declared that it would halt inspections and verifications of its
military sites by NATO countries and would no longer limit the  number of its
conventional weapons (i.e. limitations on the deployment of tanks, armored combat
vehicles, artillery and attack helicopters and combat aircraft.
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would in fact be tantamount to international recognition of its neutrality
policy pursued since early 1990s and reflected in its national security
concept in regard to future possible Sino-Russian disputes that do not
directly affect Mongolia’s vital national interests. This neutrality policy
could, with the support of the internationally recognized NWFS, be
extended to Russian and Chinese disputes with other Asian powers or
among them. There is already a wide political pre-requisite for such
recognition which is reflected in United Nations General Assembly
resolution 53/77 D entitled “Mongolia’s international security and
nuclear-weapon-free status”. The General Assembly thus has welcomed
“Mongolia’s active and positive role in developing peaceful, friendly
and mutually beneficial relations with the States of the region”, has
security and stability”. The Assembly has reiterated its support for
Mongolia’s policy in 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006. Therefore
institutionalization of the status would in fact be recognition and
acceptance of broadening further endorsed and expressed support of its
“good-neighborly and balanced relationship with its neighbors” as an
important element of strengthening regional peace, its neutrality policy.
Institutionalization of the status could serve as a legal and political
leverage in addressing the issue of the silent nuclear threat.
B.   Silent nuclear threats
The nuclear age holds enormous promises as well as hidden perils.
In the past half century the world witnessed escalation of the dangerous
nuclear arms race and a race to perfect nuclear weapons through nuclear
weapons tests. Out of 2036 registered nuclear weapon tests conducted
in the world until today, 760 (or about 27 percent of all the tests) have
been conducted by the two neighbors mostly in the vicinity of Mongolia,3
health and environmental consequences of which have yet to be studied.
We still do not know what the past holds for our children and grand-
children.
The future is not rosy as well. Acceleration of the global warming
demands innovative approaches to the issues of energy production and
use. Though renewable power like wind and solar, as well as
decentralized power generators are giving some answers, they are not
enough to adequately address the issue. That is why more and more
people are linking their hope with the nuclear energy since nuclear power
plants do not release greenhouse gases (GHGs).
3 Thus the Soviet Union conducted 207 atmospheric and 508 underground tests,
while China – 23 atmospheric and 17 underground.
46
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
Number 14, 2007
Until the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident there was
a tendency of increase in the number of nuclear power stations despite
the unresolved issues of nuclear wastes. After the Chernobyl accident
this tendency slowed down for almost two decades. Now there is again
a growing interest in and demand for nuclear power because of the
growing greenhouse effect of increased use of fossil fuel. According to
IAEA’s 2004 report, the 440 nuclear power reactors operating in the
world were producing 16% of world’s electricity, with 26 more reactors
under construction, including 18 in Asia. Entry into force of the Kyoto
Protocol is also making States parties to turn more to nuclear energy.
The role of nuclear energy is increasing especially in Northeast
Asia. Thus if by mid 1990s the share of nuclear energy in the Republic
of Korea was 36%, in Taiwan 28.8% and in Japan 33.8%, it is estimated
that by 2010 almost ½ of the world’s nuclear energy would be produced
and consumed in this region. Chinese share in nuclear energy production
is increasing.4 Along with production of nuclear energy these countries
are facing the dilemma of temporary and/or permanent disposal of
nuclear wastes, especially high level radiological wastes (HLW), the
amount of which is increasing with each passing year5. In short, the
question of disposal of nuclear wastes6 is one of the most challenging
4 It is estimated that in the next ten years China might build up to 30 new reactors, Japan –
13 and the Republic of Korea – 10. Russian is planning to double its nuclear power output by
2020, while China is planning to double it. India plans to increase it nuclear power output by 8
fold by year 2022.
5 There is a common belief that the vast territories of Siberia, Australian outback, the Gobi
Desert and Canadian Shield could be used to deposit permanently nuclear wastes. Many scientific
researches are being done and international conferences held on this issue. Thus just recently, on 19-
22 June an International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors
was held in Vienna under the auspices of IAEA, in which nearly 200 participants and observers
from 41 countries and international organizations shared information, lessons and experiences.
6 See Dr. Helen Caldicott’s article “Nuclear Power Isn’t Clean; Its Dangerous” which
demonstrates how nuclear waste threatens global health since the toxicity of many elements in
the waste is long-lived. Thus Strontium 90 remains radioactive for 600 years. Concentrating in
the food chain, it emulates the mineral calcium. Contaminated milk enters the body, where
strontium 90 concentrates in bones and lactating breasts later to cause bone cancer, leukemia and
breast cancer. Babies and children are 10 to 20 times more susceptible to the carcinogenic effects
of radiation than adults. Plutonium, the most significant element in nuclear waste, is so
carcinogenic that hypothetically half a kilo evenly distributed could cause cancer in everyone on
Earth. Lasting for half a million years, it enters the body through the lungs where it is known to
cause cancer. It mimics iron in the body, migrating to bones, where it can induce bone cancer or
leukemia, and to the liver, where it can cause primary liver cancer. It crosses the placenta into the
embryo and, like the drug thalidomide, causes gross birth deformities. Plutonium has a predilection
for the testicles, where it induces genetic mutations in the sperm of humans and other animals
that are passed on from generation to generation (see http://healthandenergy.com/
nuclear_dangers.htm).
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nuclear issues facing not only the international scientific community but
the world in general.7
Mongolia does not have nuclear reactors and thus is not a beneficiary
of nuclear technology. However, despite that she runs the risk of
becoming sandwiched between enormous nuclear waste repositories8
with all the ensuing potential long-lasting health and environmental
consequences. This is because our neighbors not only have nuclear waste
repositories on their territories that are adjacent to Mongolia, but, in
the case of Russia9 in 2001 it has adopted legislation encouraging import
of nuclear wastes from other countries10.  Thus it is estimated that in the
10 years since adoption of the 2001 legislation, Russia could import 10-
20.000 tons of nuclear waste, most of which is expected to be stored at
the storage facility in Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk region)11. There are
even talks that the decommissioned uranium mines in Krasnokamensk,
to the east of the Lake Baikal (not far from Mongolia), might be used as
a site of final (meaning eternal) disposal of nuclear wastes. Moreover,
according to fuel repatriation program agreed between Russia and U.S.
in May 2004 as part of Global Threat Reduction Initiative, a dozen
countries have become eligible to receive financial and technical
assistance from the U.S. to ship their fresh and spent research reactor
fuel, originally obtained from the Soviet Union/Russia back to Russia
for “safekeeping and reprocessing into safer materials”. Where all the
spent fuel ends up in Russia is anybody’s guess.
The above events cannot be ignored by Mongolia simply because
they are taking place in another country or that importing whatever
waste is an internal affair of that country. However the 6.8 magnitude
7 The 440 nuclear reactors have produced about 280.000 metric tons of spent nuclear
fuel (over 12.000 metric tons per year).
8 It is believed that nuclear waste remains hazardous for tens of thousands of years
and that the only way to get rid of it is to put it in containers and bury it deep underground
(and pray tat geological shifts do not disturb it).
9 No reliable information in  regard to China  is available from Chinese or other
sources
10 Meaning importing not only nuclear waste from Soviet-built nuclear power stations
but also from other nuclear reactors. Russian official reasoning for  importing nuclear
waste are as follows: to be able to upgrade Russia’s nuclear storage, clean up heavily
contaminated land and expand its nuclear processing operations at Mayak nuclear complex
in the Ural mountains.
11 Other known nuclear waste repositories are in Chelyabinsk-65"Mayak” near
Ozersk and Novaya Zemlya (Northern Archangelsk).
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earthquake that hit Japan a few weeks ago has vividly demonstrated
how radioactive elements could be released into the air (and in Japan’s
case into ocean) by nuclear power plants.
We cannot blame our neighbors for their policies and choices. It is
their sovereign choice as long as it does not now nor in the long run
adversely affects Mongolian people’s health and the environment as
described in the national security concept (paras. 49.1 and 53.2).
Therefore it is up to us Mongolians to closely examine either on our
own or together with the neighbor(s) the possible long-term effects and
consequences of having huge nuclear waste sites almost at our doorsteps.
Data or information is scarce to analyze China’s situation and policy
with regard to nuclear wastes.  What is known is that not only China’s
nuclear industry is producing nuclear waste, but that it has on a number
of occasions discussed the possibility of importing nuclear waste from
other countries to store in China, possibly in Gansu province (that
borders on Mongolia) or even in the Gobi desert. Since Russia and China,
as recognized nuclear-weapon states are not required to conclude special
agreements with IAEA on strict and rigorous inspection of their nuclear
facilities, the question of safety of their nuclear facilities and repositories
acquire special significance for Mongolia. Therefore we cannot afford
to be a passive observer of these events and ominous trends. Lately,
Kazakhstan, following the examples of Russia, is openly expressing
interest, on commercial basis, to store on its territory low or intermediate-
level nuclear waste from other countries. Would that mean that Mongolia
would have additional nuclear waste sites on its western doorsteps ?
Mongolian experts and nuclear scientists should closely follow these
and related events, make analysis of the situation from the standpoint of
Mongolian immediate and long-term interests and make concrete
proposals to the National Security Council, Parliament and Government
of Mongolia on ways to deflect the danger, on  how to engage its
neighbors, other interested states and international organizations in
addressing.
C.  Energy security
As it has been pointed out earlier in this paper, the nuclear reaction
provides enormous energy that is increasingly being used to generate
electricity. In France, for example, up to 80 % of electricity is generated
by nuclear power plants, while in Japan – almost 1/3. Though Mongolia’s
49Number 14, 2007
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
energy needs are not enormous, nevertheless it is increasing, while the
country depends highly on oil imports from Russia. That is why some
Mongolians, including some nuclear experts, propose building a small
or medium size nuclear power plant that could resolve in the main the
country’s energy needs. They say that Mongolia has enormous reserves
of uranium ores, some of which are included in the list of strategically
important mines12.  Some feasibility studies on constructing nuclear
power station(s) have already been undertaken. What is needed now is
to move beyond studies and take a decision on the best way of utilizing
the uranium mines and building nuclear power station(s) to satisfy the
increasing needs in electricity as well as reduce the dependence on foreign
energy supply. In order to do that a state policy on promoting nuclear
science and energy needs to be elaborated. Also the comprehensive
policy for national development, currently under discussion,  should
address one way or another this issue. If Mongolia decides to develop
nuclear energy, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could
provide appropriate assistance3 by its statute as well as by Article IV of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).13
Bearing the above in mind, I would recommend the following as
concrete steps to address the challenges of the nuclear age:
1. intensify our efforts to conclude a trilateral agreement with the
two immediate neighbors institutionalizing Mongolia’s NWFS and
acquire legally binding security assurances from them and other nuclear-
weapon States that they would respect Mongolia’s neutrality policy with
respect to future possible disputes among nuclear and other powers;
2. make Mongolia’s NWFS integral part of the emerging
international network of NWFZs;
12 Mardai, Dornod and Gurvan Bulag.
13 Article IV of NPT reads as follows: “(1) Noting in this Treaty shall be interpreted
as affecting the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity
with Articles I and II of this Treaty. (2) All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate,
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials
and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or
together with other States or international organizations to the further development of
the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of
non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of
the developing areas of the world.”
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3. make serious health and environmental assessment of the legacies
of over 700 nuclear-weapon tests in the vicinity of Mongolia (together
with the neighbors, other interested countries, the WHO, IAEA and
others);
4. undertake, together with the neighboring countries and the
IAEA, a study on possible environmental and health effects of nuclear
waste repositories of  neighboring countries and consider its results at
the National Security Council and parliament of Mongolia;
5. develop and adopt national policy with regard to nuclear issues,
including future uses of uranium and nuclear energy;
6. if a decision is taken to develop nuclear energy by constructing
nuclear reactors, make the best use of IAEA advise to make use of the
safest technology.
Ulaanbaatar, 21 August, 2007
